Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this study explores new horizons in the theory of strategy. In studying existing theory, it doesn’t take long to discover the fact that few theories offer any universal prescriptive utility, and the few that do are at best only slightly useful. Further complicating matters, many popular theorists such as Clausewitz suggest that any attempt to develop strategy from a prescriptive or scientific approach is dangerous. As contemporary military strategists attack new domains, what does existing theory really offer other than laundry lists of principles that may or may not be relevant?However, Robert Jervis was on to something in his exploration of the role of perceptions, the human psyche, and their role in international politics. But he leaves us hanging with notions of never being able to understand this.. .but can we deliberately try? Without falling into the overly scientific and prescriptive Fuller category, can we systematically seek to avoid pitfalls, or at least make sure our strategies don’t ignore lessons of history and relevant theories? Today, strategists are left grasping at Clausewitz’ vague description of the divined military genius as they strive to achieve Sun Tzu’s supremely important task to attack the enemy’s strategy.This study tests a hypothesis that we can build a prescriptive model for strategy development by accounting for the objective attributes of strategy development. It emphasizes paradigmatic and perceptual concepts as presented by Kuhn and Jervis. Chapter 1 presents a test model that incorporates many foundational theories on military employment, war and international relations into a single Rational Actor Model (RAM) with focus on deliberate management of Paradigms, Perceptions and Interpretation of new information (PPI) at each step.A RAM infused with traditional theory and focused on deliberate management of PPI is presented in Chapter 1. Chapters 2 and 3 then test its explanatory utility through analyses of the Berlin and Cuban Crises of the Cold War. Then Chapter 4 explores its prescriptive utility in the development of better cyber strategy for today. If proven useful, clearly the model could be utilized as a starting point for military strategists in the development of any new strategy. However, potentially more useful is the more comprehensive approach to military strategy that accounts for the interplay of all instruments of national power.